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█ Abstract Libet’s experimental setting has been criticized at length ever since its first appearance, under 
both methodological and empirical aspects. In this paper, the attention will be driven on a neglected un-
derpinning theme which has not yet been investigated, central for the economy of the argument: the time 
of choices. The pivotal role played by mental chronometry at the beginning of psychology and neurophys-
iology will be pointed out, and how the lack of a proper definition of time affected the course of the fol-
lowing research on the subject. The Aristotelian definition of time will be considered in order to cast some 
light upon Libet’s empirical findings. 
KEYWORDS: Benjamin Libet; Neuroscience; Time; Free Will; Voluntary Action. 
 
█ Riassunto Osservazioni epistemologiche sugli esperimenti di Libet sul libero arbitrio: tra volontarismo e 
volontà – Il setting sperimentale di Libet è stato duramente criticato sin dai propri esordi, sia dal punto di 
vista metodologico che empirico. In questo lavoro si porterà l’attenzione su una questione di fondo che 
sin qui non è stata indagata, e tuttavia centrale per l’economia dell’argomento: il tempo delle scelte. Sa-
ranno messi in evidenza sia il ruolo centrale svolto dalla cronometria mentale all’inizio della psicologia e del-
la neurofisiologia, sia gli effetti sul corso della ricerca determinati dall’assenza di una definizione appropriata 
di tempo. La definizione aristotelica di tempo sarà considerata per gettar luce sui risultati empirici di Libet. 




IN THE ‘80S, NEUROPHYSICIAN BENJAMIN 
Libet observed a correlation between a neu-
rophysiologic parameter, the readiness po-
tential (RP), and a simple voluntary move-
ment, such as moving one finger. Surprising-
ly, the RP was found to precede the aware-
ness of the incoming movement by about 350 
ms. A radical interpretation of these observa-
tions is that free will is an illusion, since the 
subject becomes aware of his/her intention 
to move when his/her brain has already 
started to plan the movement. The author 
himself states his conclusion in these terms: 
The experimental findings led us to the 
conclusion that voluntary acts can be ini-
tiated by unconscious cerebral processes 
before conscious intention appears.1 
 
Since then, Libet’s experiments on free will 
have been discussed many times and under 
different points of view: neurophysiological, 
philosophical, psychological, etc. In this paper 
I will focus on a neglected fundamental theme 
which has not been investigated yet and that 
is, in my opinion, central to the economy of 
the argument: the time of choices.  
Ricerche 
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Although the strength of Libet’s argument 
lies in time, this subject has not been analyzed 
in depth. In this paper I will try to fill this gap 
and to cast some light on the delicate relation-
ship between neuroscience and free will. In 
order to accomplish this task, the concept of 
time will be precious, since it entails both the-
se dimensions. It is indeed a quantitative pa-
rameter, therefore a legitimate object of sci-
ence, and a qualitative measure, deeply rooted 
in the inner region of the self. 
 
█ A historical account 
 
The role played by the notion of time in 
the rise of psychology has not been fully 
acknowledged. As a matter of fact, it was 
Hermann Helmholtz2 who first found a way 
to measure the responding time of an electri-
cal stimulus along a frog nerve, and he dis-
covered that nerve impulses travel surpris-
ingly slow, at about sixty miles per hour. 
Once the experiment was repeated on human 
beings, by asking subjects to push a buzzer as 
soon as they perceived the experimenter’s 
touch on their legs, the average speed Helm-
holtz was able to calculate was about two 
hundred miles per hour, still much more than 
expected.3 It is worth noting that Helmholtz 
was one of the most brilliant Johannes Mül-
ler’s scholars, who thought that the so called 
“neural principle” should be something simi-
lar to light, therefore immeasurable. 
These findings, not only grounded a whole 
new chapter of Science, namely psychophys-
ics, but also made clear that consciousness, de-
spite its appearance, might be fast, but cannot 
be instantaneous. The issue concerning how 
long exactly it will take for a stimulus to gen-
erate an impression was studied by Wilhelm 
Wundt,4 Helmholtz’s assistant at the Universi-
ty of Heidelberg, who opened the season of 
mental chronometry experiments, which are 
nothing but an earlier version of Libet’s exper-
iments. From a whole array of experiments, 
Wundt developed a theory of mind grounded 
on what he called perceptions and appercep-
tions. Perceptions are those kind of pre-aware 
responses to the environment that allow us to 
quickly react to any stimulus, like driving a car 
or playing ping pong, while apperceptions are 
the full, self-reflective, and conscious thought, 
well aware of what is going on. 
There is no need to go any further on de-
tails concerning the amount of discoveries 
found in this field; they range from optical 
illusions to tactile ones, where it is easy to see 
the adjustments carried out by our brain in 
order to fill sensorial gaps perceived by our 
perceptual system. It is interesting to note, 
though, that Libet himself started his physio-
logical career in the same branch, investigat-
ing5 the amount of time a stimulus needs to 
persist in order to reach the threshold of con-
sciousness. 
As we can see, the notion of time did not 
just play a central role in the rise of psycho-
physics, but it was already on the background 
even in the first steps of the emerging theo-
ries of the mind.  Nevertheless it was never 
really investigated, and I think that much of 
the debate concerning these kind of experi-
ments is due to a lack of understanding of 
this central concept. But let’s take now a 
deeper look on Libet’s experiment before 
carrying on the analysis about time, to see all 
the elements here at stake. 
 
█ On the role of conscious will in Libet’s 
experiment 
 
Libet started his inquiry defining what he 
means by a voluntary action. In his perspec-
tive, a voluntary action is identified by the 
following conditions: 
 
(a) It arises endogenously, not in direct re-
sponse to an external stimulus or cue; 
 
(b) There are no externally imposed re-
strictions or compulsions that directly or 
immediately control the subjects' initia-
tion and performance of the act; 
 
(c) Most importantly, subjects feel intro-




act on their own initiative and that they 
are free to start or not to start the act as 
they wish. 
 
These conditions could be translated in 
classical philosophical theses: (a) self-
determination; (b) absence of constraint; (c) 
a new edition of liberum arbitrium indifferen-
tiae. The neurophysician proceeds by asking 
the subjects to move their hand, or finger, 
just when they feel the desire, urge, decision, 
or will to do it. This movement will sign the 
time 0 of the incoming cognitive processes. 
The whole experiment is focused to estimate 
the amount of time running between the in-
tention to act and the necessary neurophysio-
logic processes related.  
Here is a picture/chart of the experi-
mental setting time table: 
 
 
At the end of the paragraph describing 
the experimental setting, Libet’s reader finds 
these words:  
 
Finally, one should note that the volun-
tary action studied was defined opera-
tionally, including appropriate and relia-
ble reports of introspective experiences. 
The definition is not committed to or de-
pendent upon any specific philosophical 
view of the mind-brain relationship. 
However, some implications that are rele-
vant to mind-brain theories will be drawn 
from the findings.6 
 
This kind of statement is not rare in 
Libet’s pages. He often claims to make just 
scientific remarks, free from philosophical 
commitments, but this unrequested defense 
shows rather his unwillingness to undertake 
an explicit philosophical debate. The choice 
to measure the time of intentionality, previ-
ously defined as the awareness of the stimu-
lus to act, implies the reduction of intention-
ality to its corresponding stimulus. Of course, 
this reduction is not so philosophically un-
committed as the author thinks; on the con-
trary, it shows a sort of materialistic monism 
which is a peculiar philosophical perspective 
with its own apories. 
Libet’s experimental setting has been crit-
icized at length ever since its first appear-
ance, both for methodological and empirical 
reasons.7 Here, I am going to point out a few 
underlying assumptions which might under-
mine the argumentative strength of those ex-
periments. 
Libet thought that the absence of a de-
tectable meaning of the action was an essen-
tial feature of his experiment, so that the sub-
ject could feel himself totally free to pursue 
the action or not.8 In our view, it is question-
able that the absence of meaning constitutes 
a condition of free acting, quite the opposite. 
Human actions tend to be intrinsically mean-
ingful. When conduct strikes as meaningless, 
human beings do not feel freer, but rather try 
to infuse meaning into it. 
Besides, as much as the researcher may try 
to create a neutral setting, this goal cannot be 
achieved, since it is not neutral deciding to par-
ticipate to this kind of trials. As a consequence, 
every subject shares the goal to contribute 
somehow to the success of the experiment, no 
matter how much effort has been put to make 
the environmental influence unperceivable. 
It is however worth noting that Libet him-
self did not think that his findings led to the 
complete denial of free will. Instead, he thought 
that his findings clarified how it works, by 
choosing whether to carry out tasks uncon-
sciously initiated. The author considered these 
findings coherent with the great western moral 
traditions, and pointed out how moral pre-
scriptions in most ethical systems are conceived 
in negative terms. In this view, the “ten com-
mandments” are paradigmatic as injunction 
not to act in certain ways.9  
According to Libet’s point of view, “the veto 
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function” is where the subject is in charge of his 
own behavior. In his terms, then, we are not 
free to will, but we can choose to accomplish or 
not what elsewhere has been decided to do. Ac-
cording to this conclusion, the author says that 
we should criticize those moral systems which 
aim to make people feel guilty for intentions, 
since intentions arise independently from the 
subject’s will. 
On this point, it should be noted that this 
paradigm does not apply to the type of ethics 
which stems from Christianity, where the 
principle of acting is conceived in positive 
rather than in negative terms.10 This is also 
consistent with the assumption that acting 
freely does not require only an absence of 
constraint, which could be one condition of 
its possibility, but also a goal to achieve. This 
point is full of consequences, indeed as in 
classical philosophical terms, will has always 
been conceived as dependent on intellect,11 
while in more modern times, the relationship 
between intellect, which sets goals, and will 
has changed. Starting with Occam’s volunta-
rism, will began to be conceived as something 
absolute, preceding intellect.  
Libet’s experiments endorse this kind of 
assumption, together with all the apories 
which result from it. In order to summarize 
some of the most problematical Libetian as-
sumptions, it is possible to say that: 
 
(1) concepts like “free will”, “consciousness”, 
“will”, and “voluntary” have been adopt-
ed according to different meanings, so 
that they determine what in logical terms 
should be considered a paralogism, that 
is an apparent argument that is however 
formally incorrect; 
 
(2)  will has been considered just as a quanti-
tative substance, whereas this assump-
tion is highly problematic; 
 
(3) one assumption in Libet’s studies is that 
will has to be “pure will”, which is how-
ever something that does not exist in re-
ality: every will is a will of something and 
it is expressed by someone. Moreover, 
this assumption is not empirically verifi-
able. This is also the reason why the em-
pirical setting is inappropriate. There is a 
measurement bias: while different times 
have been measured in different ways, 
corresponding to electrophysiological 
times and introspective times, neverthe-
less these times have been put together on 
an identical scale, rated in milliseconds, 
conforming therefore to one another; 
 
(4)  even if we adopt Libet’s empirical set-
ting, it is possible to give a different in-
terpretation of his results, by stressing 
the difference between free will and the 
awareness of free will, which is properly 
what has been investigated; 
 
(5)  if we had to repeat these experiments, we 
should not pretend to investigate a chi-
merical pure free will; rather, we should 
study the actual free will, necessarily 
connected with the intellect, which 
means that the will is somewhat bound 
to the object that the intellect knows. In 
philosophical literature, will is classified 
in two ways: a potential one, and an ac-
tual one; the former leads to the elicit 
act, the latter to the imperate act; in oth-
er terms, there is a clear difference be-
tween a voluntary action and an action 
which has been wanted “per se”. Elicit 
action, the will to will, is direct, without 
intermediations, not coercible; imperate 
action comes from will by means of other 
operative skills, such as walking or talk-
ing, which could be impaired, by forcing 
those imperate actions (which were per-
formed by the voice or the legs in the 
previous examples). 
 
When someone decides to reach an object 
on a table, he has to stand up (assuming he 
was sitting), and start to walk towards his 
goal; while the decision to reach the object is 
an elicit one, the chain of actions needed to 




course, but not necessarily wanted “per se”. 
Standing up and walking in our example are 
instrumental actions performed to fulfill the 
original intention to reach the aimed object. 
It is our thesis that Libet’s experiment de-
scribes at its best the course of a voluntary ac-
tion, not free will, since the elicit decision to 
cooperate at the experiment was already taken 
when people started the experimental session, 
so that the tasks performed (finger/wrist flex-
ion) were just voluntary actions.12 
I find two kinds of intertwined problems 
in Libet’s works: the mind-body problem and 
the conception of time. These two problems, 
which are clearly different problems, are in-
terconnected in Libet’s experiments, where 
time is conceived as the measure of the rela-
tion between mind and brain. Given to his 
“spatial” conception of time, Libet sets the 
mind-brain problem in a way that is both 
subtly spatial and materialistic. In epistemo-
logical terms, Libet swings between a dualis-
tic and a monistic point of view. 
 
█ Mental chronometry 
 
As it is correctly stated in Libet’s last mono-
graph on this topic: it’s all about time. Then, 
the question becomes: what kind of time? 
Since Helmholtz, time has been consid-
ered just as a quantitative parameter13, some-
thing suitable to be rated in seconds or parts 
of seconds, such as actual millisecond (Ms), 
but this is not time, it is just a possible kind 
of its measurement. This misunderstanding 
inevitably compromises the debate about 
these experiments. 
Let’s take a closer look to this problem. 
Time is one of the deepest philosophical 
problems of western thought. Of course, it is 
not possible to offer here not even a small 
picture of its history. Let’s just consider Aris-
totle’s classical definition of time: «the num-
ber of motion in respect of before and af-
ter».14 I choose to start from Aristotle’s per-
spective not simply for its classical and well 
deserved status, but above all for its explicit 
reference to the notion of number, which 
makes this definition more useful to develop 
a quantitative perspective. 
So, time is a kind of number. Therefore, 
we need to understand what a number is in 
order to grasp the essence of time in Aristo-
tle’s philosophy. In Aristotle’s arithmology, 
number covers at least three different kinds 
of meanings: numerus numeratus, numerus 
numerabilis, and numerus numerans. The 
first is the sense of what is counted, the se-
cond is the sense of what is possible to count, 
and the third is the sense of what we count 
with. The former and the latter of these 
meanings constitute respectively the matter 
and the form of the number, while the mid-
dle one, numerus numerabilis, synthesizes 
both of the previous concepts, and this is the 
sense in which Aristotle thought of a number 
in reference to time.15 
These concepts can be exemplified by say-
ing that the first sense of the word refers to 
the existent beings, the objects of the action 
of numbering; the second refers to the possi-
bility of being numbered, and the third refers 
to the active principle of number, which is 
intellect in Aristotle’s view. So, the question 
becomes: what does “possibility of being 
numbered” mean?  
Something can be numbered for the sake 
of both the other meanings of the concept: 
either the faculty of intellect to enumerate 
something, or the capability of existent be-
ings to be counted. However, Aristotle’s real 
idea on this point was more radical, as he 
meant that possibility is not something just 
due to the intellect or existent beings, but is, 
rather, a real property of movement. 
The constitution of possibility is a subtle 
metaphysical problem in Aristotle’s philoso-
phy that cannot be further explored in the 
present work. For the present purpose, it is 
enough to point out that this notion of num-
ber entails both the objective and the subjec-
tive dimension, and time lies at the intersec-
tion of these two realities.16 
So, if time is a real possibility which can 
be expressed in mathematical terms, one first 
counterintuitive consequence is that every 
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phenomenon has a proper time, suitable to 
be numbered according to its own nature. 
This is why simply rating every conscious-
ness’ phenomenon in Ms fails to discover its 
inner temporality. Let’s consider an example. 
If we take the action of grasping a glass of 
water on a table and we divide the action into 
its steps, ranging from the intention to reach 
the glass (maybe because we are thirsty), to 
the motor planning of the task (how we plan 
to move our arm), to the actual movement of 
grasping, we obtain at least three different 
aspects of the same reality. The key point is 
that these aspects are always essentially relat-
ed to the same action, which is described, 
first, under the perspective of phenomenolo-
gy (intention), then, under that of physiology 
(motor planning), and eventually under the 
domain of the intended goal (the actual 
reaching for the glass). 
It is of course possible to time every single 
aspect of this analysis, by measuring the time 
running in each phase of the action, but these 
measurements should not be misunderstood, 
by assuming that they express the time of the 
single phase, since this phase does not really 
exist extrapolated from its context. This very 
simple truth is never taken into account in 
Libet’s experiments. In fact, he divides the 
course of the action in different steps, each 
one with a proper timing, and claims that the 
former is the cause for the latter.  
Besides falling into the well known post 
hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy, Libet’s ar-
gument takes for granted the epistemological 
legitimacy of the segmentation of action that 
he operates. Unfortunately, this segmenta-
tion does not seem to be justified. To consid-
er the awareness of the incoming action as 
something that could stand alone, without 
relations to the following action or to the 
previous intention to act, is simply epistemo-
logically incorrect, since the action has a 
proper physiognomy, which entails the inten-
tion of acting and the actual action. The 
same goes for timing. The time of awareness, 
which must follow logically the object of con-
sciousness, gradually arises from the stimu-
lus, either internal (an intention) or external 
(a perception). 
 
█ Toward a different interpretation of Li-
bet’s experiments  
 
French philosopher Henry Bergson, in his 
doctoral thesis named Essai sur les données 
immédiates de la conscience,17 significantly 
translated in English as Time and Free Will: 
An Essay on the Immediate Data of Con-
sciousness, points out that modern science, 
but above all, the emerging psychophysics, 
fails to address “the problem of time”, since 
conceives it in spatial terms. Although it is 
not possible to repeat the dense argumenta-
tive structure of this work, it is worth noting 
that it starts with a logical analysis of the 
concept of number, which brought the au-
thor to discern two opposite senses of time, a 
quantitative one, namely spatial, and a quali-
tative one, related to the central concept of 
durée. Bergson clearly saw how time and 
space have been mistakenly merged together. 
In his view, on the contrary, duration, or 
time, has no juxtaposition of events. 
According to Bergson,18 duration has to 
be understood as a qualitative multiplicity, as 
opposed to a quantitative multiplicity. In Es-
sai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 
it is possible to find several examples of a 
quantitative multiplicity. When someone 
looks at a flock of sheep, what is noticed is 
that they all look alike. Thus a quantitative 
multiplicity is always homogeneous. Moreo-
ver, it is possible to enumerate the sheep, de-
spite their homogeneity. This is why each 
sheep is spatially separated from or juxta-
posed to the others; in other terms, each oc-
cupies a discernable spatial location.  
Therefore, quantitative multiplicities are 
homogeneous and spatial. Since a quantita-
tive multiplicity is homogeneous, it is also 
possible to represent it with a symbol, for in-
stance, a sum: “33”. On the contrary, qualita-
tive multiplicities are heterogeneous and 
temporal; qualitative multiplicity implies 




While the external world can be defined 
by the juxtaposition of its elements, and 
therefore can be considered as ruled by the 
law of impenetrability of bodies, duration 
implies the opposite feature: the mutual in-
terpenetration of bodies. Here lies the main 
and irreducible difference between time and 
space. All the mistakes about time, in Berg-
son’s perspective, derive from the illegitimate 
spatialization of time.20 
If Bergson’s analysis has to be taken seri-
ously, time needs to be framed in a different 
way. In other words, time cannot be rated 
just in Ms anymore, as this would constitute 
an improper spatialization of its nature. 
Time should rather be seen as duration, as 
something persisting throughout the becom-
ing of things. Bearing these remarks in mind, 
it is possible to interpret Readiness Poten-
tials, which are Libet’s main argument to his 
thesis, in a new way, according to new studies 
conducted on choice-reaction tasks experi-
ments.  
In other terms, if I am correct in consider-
ing the consciousness of time as a lasting re-
ality because of its reference (numerability in 
Aristotle’s vocabulary) to the mind, RPs 
should be considered as a sort of orientation 
to action. This simple phenomenological in-
sight is not only coherent with the normal 
experience of actions, but also allows us to 
avoid the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo prop-
ter hoc aforementioned. It is indeed clear that 
orientation does not mean determination, 
but only an inclination to take a course of ac-
tion, which can be stopped whenever it 
should appear reasonable to not carry it out. 
C.S. Herrmann21 conducted an experi-
ment where participants observed a stimulus 
on a computer monitor and were instructed 
to press one of two buttons, depending on 
the presented stimulus. It has been found 
that neural activity precedes the motor re-
sponse, as in the case of Libet's experiments. 
However, this activity was already present 
prior to stimulus presentation, and thus be-
fore participants could decide which button 
to press. Therefore, it has been argued that 
this activity does not specifically determine 
behavior. Instead, it may reflect a general ex-
pectation. 
While there is no need to point out how 
this interpretation would not interfere with 
the notion of free will, it is interesting to note 
again the role played by time in this new ex-
perimental setting. Chronologically priority is 
a key to understand a certain phenomenon. In 
this case, it is the electrical activity recorded 
into the brain that precedes the possibility of 
the soon to come choice, so it cannot be in-
ferred that this activity determines the incom-
ing action. RP can rather be considered a sort 
of preparation to action, which is consistent 
with a theory of action in which time is not 
discrete, but continuous.  
Predisposition, expectation, preparation 
are all concepts meant to describe the condi-
tion triggered by this Readiness Potential 
which draws a structure not suitable to be di-
vided in a clear cut sequence of stages. Ra-
ther it identifies the preparatory phase of 
continuous course of movements, ranging 
from the orientation to act, to the intention 
to act, to the preparation to act, and eventu-
ally to the action itself. The final action is 
more than the actual visible effect; it entails 
all the preparatory states which have been 
previously considered, so it would be naive to 
divide the action from what it stems from. 
It is worth mentioning that the idea that 
RPs is connected with the subsequent inten-
tion to act had already been put forth by 
John Eccles22 in his commentary on Libet’s 
work. Libet was more interested in the “veto 
function” of consciousness, which in his 
mind showcased a sort of consciousness pri-




Libet’s experiments have different merits: 
they have revived the topic of mental chro-
nometry; they have showed the need to de-
velop a working hypothesis on mind, in order 
to understand the meaning of experiments 
involving brain-mind connections; they have 
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relaunched the mind-body problem, and 
have opened to both the classical answers 
given to that issue, namely dualism and mon-
ism, even if Libet himself never clearly en-
dorsed either of these perspectives (while Ec-
cles, his mentor, did). 
It is not just of historical interest to note 
that psychophysics gained a new and sound 
vitality by rediscovering its original roots, 
namely, mental chronometry. It is also of 
great philosophical interest to see how the 
role of time has played a pivotal role in this 
revival. I find it truly fascinating to note that 
whoever has tried to think about the mystery 
of consciousness (both with a scientific or 
philosophical approach) was driven to con-
sidering the problem of time. Just consider, 
among the others, eminent thinkers such as 
Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Kant, 
Bergson, Helmholtz, etc. 
There is a strong link between time and 
will, as well as between time and intellect, 
since time defines their “perimeter” (but pay 
attention to the spatial image) of exercise: 
you cannot want something already hap-
pened in the past, nor you can actually want 
something yet to happen in the future. It is of 
course possible to desire something different 
for past and for future, but desire is different 
from will under many respects. The same 
goes for intellect, which can exercise its ca-
pability of understanding strictly speaking 
just on current things; of course one can try 
to predict the course of events, or even re-
trace historical facts, and yet, prediction and 
rebuilding facts differ from intellect. They 
are both intellectual operations, but both 
predictions ad retrospections are based on 
the analysis of present, which allows us to 
project our conjectures on future and past. 
Going back to the picture I’ve chosen to 
exemplify Libet’s findings, it is possible to see 
the arrow of time upon which the different 
times of events are marked: the recorded RP 
onset; then the inner decision to move (alt-
hough it would have been more correct to say 
that it was the time of the awareness of that 
decision); and eventually the actual move-
ment. It has not been paid enough attention 
to the fact that, besides all these different and 
punctual times, each of these events is 
“placed” on an arrow. This means that there 
is a sort of general time, within which other 
different times fall.  
Although this kind of representations is 
quite usual in scientific papers, where it is 
common to see time symbolized on the x-axis 
and therefore remaining in a spatial paramet-
rical background, it could be said that this 
more general time, the time of the arrow, is 
the real time of the action, within which are 
possible other timings, as long as we bear in 
mind that these further times depend on the 
first and comprehensive one. 
In other terms there is a basic time inher-
ent to the course of the action as a whole, 
which is represented by the arrow, and then 
many other possible times to be sequenced, 
each of them referring to the main one in or-
der to be intelligible. If this reference gets 
lost, as it happens every time these temporal 
sequences are considered per se, the meaning 
of them gets lost, too. So, if we accept that 
the action cannot be too harshly divided, we 
should also understand why each time rec-
orded on that arrow has to be read as inter-
connected to the others.  
Therefore, it makes no sense to say that 
RP anticipating the awareness of the incom-
ing action is determining our will. In this 
conceptual framework, the meaning of RP is 
completely different: it is the brain’s first de-
tectable signal of the incoming chain of 
events, eventually culminating into the ac-
tion, as it is shown also by Hermann’s empir-
ical evidences. 
An adequate conception of time, both in-
ner and external, allows us to shed some light 
on the relationship between voluntary acts 
and willed ones. The classic distinction be-
tween elicit and imperate acts can be read in 
the same way time and times relate to one 
another within the action, being the former a 
sort of princeps analogatus of the latter. This 
means that will has to be conceived primarily 




and only secondarily in the sense of the im-
perate act, which is intelligible only in rela-
tion to the first act. 
Starting with Aristotle’s conception of 
time, it was natural to adopt his theory of 
analogy to show the relationship between 
time and Will, which are both analogical 
concepts. They have different meanings, but 
all depend on a main meaning, which in the 
case of time is “the number of motion in re-
spect of before and after”, and in that of will 
is the elicit choice to will something for itself, 
not for any other reasons. A thoughtful in-
terpretation of Libet’s experiments should 
not confuse an imperate action and an elicit 
choice. That is the real illusion, because no 
matter how much effort the experimenter 
has devoted to mask the task, the choice of 
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